

The IRONSIDES Project: Final Report

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Introduction


DNS is both important and implemented poorly.

IRONSIDES is an Ada/SPARK DNS implementation intended as proof-of-concept:


Can DNS server be implemented on a modest (!!!) development budget with provable security properties?

What does adding provable security properties do to performance?

Milestone 1: Authoritative server on Linux [2012]




BIND and IRONSIDES performance -- Linux



Milestone 2: Authoritative server under Windows (2013)


**DNS server performance
(queries/ms)**

■ BIND ■ IRONSIDES ■ Win DNS




Milestone 3: Recursive server, performance comparisons (2017)


RECURSIVE QUERIES




Test bed




Test bed




max queries per second (authoritative, Unix)




max queries per second (authoritative, Windows)




queries sent vs max queries per second (recursive,Unix)




queries sent vs max queries per second (recursive,Windows)




% queries lost vs max queries per second (recursive,Unix)




% queries lost vs max queries per second (recursive,Windows)



latency in microseconds vs max queries per second (recursive, Unix)



**latency in microseconds vs max queries per second
(recursive,Windows)**



Insights from experience

Performance doesn't need to be sacrificed to improve security. In fact, there are instances where SPARK and formal methods make faster code.

Conversely, instances where SPARK requirements slow things down, must use manual overrides.

Role of compiler important!

Tools are impressive and humbling.

Provable security properties in IRONSIDES

- No classic buffer overflow
- No incorrect calculation of buffer size
- No improper initialization
- No ineffective statements
- No integer overflow/wraparound
- No information leakage
- All input validated
- No allocation w/o limits (no resource exhaustion)

Provable security properties in IRONSIDES

- No improper array indexing
- No null pointer dereferencing
- No expired pointer dereferencing (use after free)
- No type confusion
- No race conditions
- No incorrect conversions
- No uncontrolled format strings
- All loops guaranteed to terminate

Conclusions

- Comparable performance
- Far fewer resources, lower development costs
- Why similar approaches not more widely adopted?
- Upgrade IRONSIDES to more current version of SPARK
- Develop web server with similar properties
- Formal methods and SCADA, performance